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INTRODUCTION 
In two recent articles, Bernard S. Sharfman and Steven J. Toll argue 
that cases of corporate malfeasance, such as the failure by Enron‘s board to 
prevent the fraudulent actions of its top executives, can be explained in part 
by the ―dysfunctional deference‖1 of board members to corporate manage-
ment.2  Sharfman and Toll posit that outside directors who are themselves 
corporate executivesespecially CEOstend to identify with the goals 
and interests of fellow members of the ―executive class.‖  Instead of ques-
tioning the actions of corporate managers as their own knowledge and in-
stincts counsel, such directors defer to the company‘s insiders.  Sharfman 
and Toll go on to suggest five ways to address the deference problem: (1) 
―[l]imit the number‖ of current or former executives sitting on a board; (2) 
set term limits for directors; (3) require directors to be knowledgeable about 
the company on whose board they sit; (4) ―[n]ominate outside directors 
with diverse backgrounds‖; and (5) require ―minimum time commit-
ment[s]‖ for board members.3 
This Essay argues that Sharfman‘s and Toll‘s argument about the dan-
gers of dysfunctional deference, while insightful, fails to address the prob-
lem of excessive deference by directors other than corporate executives.  In 
its annual study of board practices at U.S. companies, RiskMetrics Group 
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1
  Bernard S. Sharfman & Steven J. Toll, Dysfunctional Deference and Board Composition: Lessons 
from Enron, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 153, 155 (2008), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/38/LRColl2008n38Sharfman&Toll.pdf [he-
reinafter Sharfman & Toll, Dysfunctional Deference] (link). 
2
  Id. at 153–60; Bernard S. Sharfman & Steven J. Toll, A Team Production Approach to Corporate 
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current executives of other companies (a group primarily comprised of 
CEOs); investors or financial/accounting professionals; consultants; attor-
neys; academics; real estate professionals; retired persons; and ―others.‖4  
Members of each of these groups bring certain strengths and weaknesses to 
a board of directors, and a reduction in the proportion of outside executives 
on a board necessarily means that the proportion of board members from 
other backgrounds will increase.  In order to alleviate the deference prob-
lem, while still allowing companies to benefit from the skills and expe-
riences of current and former executives, I argue that shareholders should 
focus on mitigating the dangers of deferential or laissez-faire boards, rather 
than focusing on the number of outside directors with a corporate back-
ground.  Shareholders can help make certain that the board they empanel 
will not be excessively deferential by: 
 
 Ensuring that directors have sufficient time to devote 
to board and committee meetings, and to familiarize 
themselves with the company‘s operations and busi-
ness environment; 
 Ensuring that board meeting agendas are set by an in-
dependent chairman or an independent lead director; 
and 
 Improving board accountability through the elimina-
tion of staggered board elections and the replacement 
of plurality voting standards with the majority vote 
system seen in most of the world. 
 
Before presenting possible methods for implementing these goals, I 
explore the ways in which non-corporate outside directors may display dys-
functional deference and identify the strengths and benefits particular to 
corporate directors.  It is important to note, however, that this piece is not 
intended as a defense of CEOs as board members.  Although they can bring 
certain strengths to a board, the weaknesses Sharfman and Toll identify are 
real.  The purpose of this article, rather, is to urge investors to focus on 
measures that will improve board performance regardless of who sits on the 
board. 
I. NON-CORPORATE OUTSIDE DIRECTORS: STRENGTHS AND 
WEAKNESSES 
In determining the optimum composition of a given company‘s board 
of directors, shareholders and nominating committees must consider a wide 
variety of qualifications.  Ideally, directors should have an understanding of 
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ing, and management, coupled with an understanding of the company- and 
industry-specific issues the corporation faces.  Additionally, they should 
have an ability to advise management wisely in the formulation of strategy, 
and a willingness to say no to charismatic chief executives whose growth 
strategies cross the line into empire building.  Above all, directors must be 
able to effectively represent the interests of the company‘s owners, which in 
turn requires the ability to commit a significant amount of time to the 
board.5  An outside board chair or lead independent director (in cases where 
the chair and CEO roles are combined) must moreover command the re-
spect and support of his or her fellow directors in order to serve as an effec-
tive counterweight to the CEO‘s authority.  
Sharfman and Toll focus on the ways in which the effectiveness of di-
rectors with a corporate executive background may be impaired by a ten-
dency to be excessively deferential to the managers they are supposed to 
oversee.  But directors with other backgrounds may have their own barriers 
to effectiveness, and their own reasons for excessive deference. 
A. Professional Service Providers 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in the wake of accounting 
scandals at Enron, Worldcom, and elsewhere, requires the audit committees 
of U.S. corporations to include at least one designated financial expert.6  An 
easy way to meet this requirement is to appoint an active or retired accoun-
tant to the board.  Where that accountant is employed by the company‘s 
own audit firm, however (and in particular where he or she is a revenue-
sharing partner of that firm), the potential for conflicts of interest is ob-
vious.7  Similar conflicts can arise in the context of other professional ser-
vices and service providers, such as attorneys and management consultants.  
No matter the industry, the more dependent the service provider is on the 
revenue from a particular client, the more difficult it will be for that provid-
er to actin his role as a directorin a way that might cause the corporate 
client to reconsider its relationship with the firm (by cutting the client com-
pany‘s CEO pay, for example).  Large companies that regularly rotate their 
audit firms, or that employ numerous law firms as outside counsel, may 
have difficulty finding accountants or lawyers without such conflicts to 





  See, e.g., Ed Speidel & Rob Surdel, High Technology Board Compensation, BOARDROOM 
BRIEFING, Spring 2008, at 25, available at http://www.directorsandboards.com/BBSpring08proof.pdf 
(―In 2005, directors spent more than 200 hours fulfilling board-related duties, up from between 100 to 
150 hours pre-Sarbanes-Oxley, according to the National Association of Corporate Directors.‖) (link); 
David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors 10 (Oct. 
2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy) (ob-
serving that ―a conscientious outside director may spend about 250 hours a year on company business‖).  
6
  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2006) (link). 
7
  For example, such a director would have difficulty objectively evaluating the quality of the audit 
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B. Academic Directors 
Business school professors and other academics will likely be free of 
financial conflicts (except to the extent that they may provide consulting 
services to corporations on the side) and their knowledge of corporate 
finance or marketing may add a useful perspective to board deliberations.  
But there are other factors that may interfere with an academic‘s ability to 
perform effectively as an outside director.  A perception that they are deni-
zens of the ivory tower may make fellow directors discount their opinions, 
while a lack of ―real-world‖ executive experience of their own may lead 
them to defer to the expertise of managementpotentially another form of 
―dysfunctional deference.‖  A desire to not jeopardize a lucrative and pres-
tigious side job may also cause academic directors to not want to rock the 
boat by challenging the CEO. 
It is useful to consider the example of Korea, where an especially large 
percentage of outside directors have an academic background, to illustrate 
these potential problems.8  In practice, Korean boards tend to be highly de-
ferential to the corporation‘s chairmanwho is always an executive and is 
usually the company‘s founder or the founder‘s heir.9  Korean board mem-
bers have been so deferential, in fact, that the boards of several corporations 
have retained top executives who were convicted of felonies.10  On paper, 
such directors generally appear to be independent: they seem to have no re-
lationships that will compromise their independence, and to have very dif-





  Out of a sample of 538 outside directors at 148 large Korean companies, whose backgrounds were 
categorized by RMG in 2008, exactly 200 (37.2 percent) were classified as ―academic.‖  By contrast, 
only six percent of outside directors in the United States were classified as academics.  Data compiled 
by author from an internal RMG study (2009) (on file with author).   
9
  Most major chaebol companiesthe large corporate groups that dominate the Korean econo-
myhave hereditary succession within the founding family.  Examples of such dynasties include the 
Lee family at the Samsung group, the Chey family at the SK group, and the Chung family at the Hyun-
dai groupwhich divided into sub-groups headed by different family members after the death of pa-
triarch Chung Ju-Yung.  See Craig Ehrlich & Dae Seob Kang, Independence Within Hyundai?, 22 U. 
PA. J. INT‘L ECON. L. 709, 720–25 (2001); Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Samsung’s Lee Family Accused of 
Corrupt Dealings, FORBES.COM, Nov. 13, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/11/13/samsung-
corruption-investigation-face-markets-cx_jc_1113autofacescan01.html (link); SK Corp. Chairman Im-
prisoned, BBC NEWS, Jun. 13, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2986698.stm (link).  
10
  Examples of companies that kept founding family members in office despite felony convictions 
include Hyundai Motor Co. and the former SK Corporation, now SK Holdings.  SK Corp. Chairman 
Chey Tae-Won was convicted of fraud and breaches of fiduciary responsibilities in 2003 for events that 
took place at an affiliated company; he served several months in prison.  See, e.g., Song Jung-A, SK 
Head Denies Fraud Conviction at Appeal, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at 28 (link); Andrew Ward, Battle 
for Influence over SK Corp Intensifies, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004, at 30 (link).  Hyundai Motor Chairman 
& CEO Chung Mong-Koo was convicted of fraud and embezzlement in 2007 and received a three-year 
prison sentence, though his sentence was suspended due to concern that locking him up could damage 
the Korean economy.  See, e.g., Evan Ramstad & Lina Yoon, Hyundai Chairman Is Found Guilty, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2007, at A2; Evan Ramstad, ISS Backs Rejecting Hyundai Chief, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
29, 2008, at B5; Song Jung-A, Korean Fund to Oppose Hyundai Head, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, at 15 
(link).  Chey and Chung remain chairmen of their respective companies as of this writing. 
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oversee.  Under Sharfman‘s and Toll‘s theory, the divergence of the aca-
demic director‘s career path from that of the corporation‘s CEO should 
imply that the academic director is unlikely to identify with the executive 
team.  Yet there is little evidence that the academic‘s ―unexecutive‖ back-
ground leads to stricter scrutiny of Korean management.11 
C. Shareholder Representatives 
Of all the categories of outside directors, investor representatives 
should be the least likely to exhibit excessive deference to management.  
Yet there are other reasons why investor representatives are not always 
ideal candidates for the board.  In the United States, when investor repre-
sentatives serve on a board, it is generally the result of a proxy contest or a 
compromise reached to forestall a proxy contest.  This, in turn, means that 
the company in question is likely to have underperformed its peers.  The 
circumstances surrounding an investor representative‘s election to the board 
may therefore lead to an adversarial relationship between the shareholder 
representatives and management.  Such tension can be beneficial for all 
shareholders if it leads to stricter oversight.  
There will be situations, however, in which the interests of the investor 
who nominates these directors do not correspond to the interests of other 
shareholders.  For example, an investment fund with a large enough stake to 
win board representation may, because of its large size, be unable to easily 
sell that stake on the open market.  Accordingly, the investment fund will 
be concerned about an exit strategygenerally with a much shorter time 
horizon than that of an index fund or other long-term investor.12  This is one 
reason institutional shareholders often find it difficult to support the dissi-
dent slate in a proxy contest.  Meanwhile, pension funds and mutual funds 
seldom own enough shares in any single company to justify the costs of en-
tering a proxy contest in order to win direct board representation or of 
maintaining such presence once successful.13  This means that the share-
holder representatives on U.S. boards tend to represent hedge funds and the 





  Governance problems at Korean companies, and in particular the lack of oversight by boards over 
Korean executives, have been widely blamed for the existence of the so-called ―Korea discount,‖ whe-
reby Korean companies trade at lower multiples of earnings than their counterparts in other countries.  
See, e.g., Ward, supra note 10. 
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  See Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap for Achiev-
ing Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 251–52 (2007) (link). 
13
  Id. at 251.  Cf. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1048–1056 (2007) (―Mutual funds . . . suffer from a num-
ber of disadvantages that impede their ability to act as effective [corporate] monitors.‖) (link). 
14
  See Illig, supra note 12, at 228.  The potential enactment of a ―proxy access‖ mechanism, where-
by long-term shareholders with a significant stake may directly nominate board candidates to appear on 
the company‘s proxy ballot, could facilitate the election of more shareholder representatives to U.S. 
boards in a less adversarial manner than typical proxy contests.  Business organizations have strongly 
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In some other countries, notably Japan, it is nearly always long-term 
shareholders who are granted seats on the board.  Such shareholders are 
generally customers of, or suppliers or lenders to, the company in question.  
The shareholding is less a portfolio investment than a manifestation of the 
far more important transactional relationship between the two companies.  
These shareholders have a much longer time horizon than typical share-
holders, and their nearly unconditional support for management is precisely 
what makes them highly desirable owners from a management perspective.  
Yet the possibility of a conflict of interest between these business partner 
representatives and other unaffiliated shareholders is acute, particularly in a 
takeover situation.  An executive of supplier company (―S‖) who sits on the 
board of a takeover target (―T‖) will have a fiduciary duty to the sharehold-
ers of S that requires her to preserve and enhance all of S‘s key business re-
lationshipswhich may require rejecting the takeover offer for T, even at a 
significant premium.  The executive‘s duty to supplier company S can easi-
ly conflict with her fiduciary duty to the shareholders of takeover target T: 
her duty to maximize the value of their investment.15  For this reason, repre-
sentatives of lenders and business partners do not meet most investors‘ de-
finition of independence, and their presence on the board is considered a 
mixed blessing at best. 
In light of these grounds for concern about the suitability of profes-
sional service providers, academics, and shareholder representatives, it is 
perhaps not surprising that active and retired corporate executives make up 
a substantial percentage of directors in the United States.16  Nor, it seems, 
can those who fault the American corporate governance system because it 
allows CEOs to collect excessive pay and assume excessive risk place the 
                                                                                                                           
resisted proxy access, however, and have succeeded in forestalling SEC action on the issue for several 
years.  See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Corporate News: Policy Makers Work to Give Shareholders More 
Boardroom Clout, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at B4 (―David T. Hirschman, a policy executive at the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the nation‘s largest business lobby, said proxy access could hurt compa-
nies.  ‗The system is designed for shareholders to entrust the board to do the job right,‘ he said.  ‗Any-
thing that makes it harder for that to happen is a step backward.‘‖) (link); Melissa Klein Aguilar, 
Activists Vow Litigation over Proxy Access, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Dec. 4, 2007, 
http://www.complianceweek.com/article/3818/activists-vow-litigation-over-proxy-access (link); Subodh 
Mishra, Analysis: Legislating Reforms, RISKMETRICS GROUP RISK & GOVERNANCE WEEKLY, Sept. 26, 
2008, http://www.riskmetrics.com/governance_weekly/2008/185 (link). 
15
  The dominance of such so-called ―stable shareholders‖ is what has enabled Japanese companies 
such as Hokuetsu Paper Mills (in 2006) and Bull-Dog Sauce Co. (in 2007) to reject unsolicited takeover 
offers, denying independent shareholders the right to tender their shares for substantial premiums, and 
has enabled many other companies to fend off shareholder proposals calling for share buybacks and div-
idend increases.  See, e.g., Hiroto Tanaka & Takenori Miyamoto, Japan Firms Seize on Court Ruling to 
Further Cross-Shareholdings, NIKKEI.COM, July 30, 2007 (―More than 80% of shareholders approved 
Bull-Dog Sauce‘s defense measures at its annual meeting mainly because the Worcester sauce maker 
was able to secure the backing of its business partners and creditor banks.‖); Takeshi Kawasaki, Market 
Scramble: Shareholders Overlooked in Battle for Hokuetsu Paper, NIKKEI.COM, Aug. 22, 2006. 
16
  Active corporate executives constitute 15 percent of outside directors at S&P 1500 companies, 
while retired persons, a large percentage of whom are retired executives, constitute 33 percent of outside 
directors.  See RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 4, at 28. 
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blame solely on the shoulders of the ―executive class‖: directors with non-
executive backgrounds may suffer from excessive deference problems and a 
lack of independence as well.  Moreover, current and former executives do 
have certain strengths that can enable them to play a positive role on boards 
as outside directors, provided the proper mechanisms exist to keep their in-
terests aligned with those of ordinary shareholders. 
II. THE STRENGTHS OF THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE  
Corporate executives, particularly those who have served successfully 
as CEOs, have the ability to draw on their own management experience not 
only in advising management of the company on whose board they sit, but 
also to rally support from other outside directors when it becomes necessary 
to break with management‘s plans.  In fact, a recent study of director ap-
pointments at 5,400 U.S. companies found that ―firms that appoint CEOs to 
their board have the best performance.‖17   
One reason why outside CEOs on the board may correlate with im-
proved performance may simply be that they serve as a check on the author-
ity of the target company‘s CEO.  CEOs of most large U.S. companies tend 
to chair their own boards,18 which gives them the ability to set the board‘s 
agenda and to guide deliberations.  Such concentration of power is widely 
considered unacceptable in the United Kingdom,19 but institutional investors 
in the U.S. have largely accepted itprovided the company designates one 
of its outside directors as a ―lead independent director.‖20  The duties of the 
lead director include, at a minimum, approving board meeting schedules 
and agendas, being available for direct communication with shareholders, 
and presiding over meetings of the independent directors that management 
does not attend.  Common sense would dictate, however, that for a lead di-
rector to serve effectively as an alternate locus of board authority, that indi-
vidual would need to convince her fellow directors to join with her in 





  Rüdiger Fahlenbrach et al., Why Do Firms Appoint CEOs as Outside Directors? 18 (Fisher Col-
lege of Business Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2008-03-009, July 27, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1160276 (link).  The authors hypothesize that CEOs 
are more willing to serve at companies whose performance is good to begin with and that one effect of 
appointing a CEO to the board is to ―certify‖ that the company‘s performance and governance are good.  
Id. 
18
  Only 38 percent of S&P 500 companies separated the chairman and CEO positions as of 2008, 
while 46 percent of S&P 1500 companies did so.  Five years earlier, in 2003, the percentages were 21 
percent and 30 percent, respectively.  See RISKMETRICS GROUP, supra note 4, at 22. 
19
  See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § A.2.1, at 6 (2003) 
(U.K.), available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf (―The roles of chairman and chief 
executive should not be exercised by the same individual.  The division of responsibilities between the 
chairman and chief executive should be clearly established, set out in writing, and agreed by the board.‖) 
(link). 
20
  See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling Through the Gaps Be-
tween Law and Practice, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 521, 548 (2007) (link).   
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tendency on the part of directors to defer to management, the lead director 
will need to be able to formulate an alternative plan and to sell that plan to 
the other directors.  In such a scenario, the ―CEO skill set‖ is likely to come 
in handy. 
On the other hand, the job of CEO is considered by investors to be an 
extremely demanding one, and there are serious questions as to whether an 
active CEO can devote the time needed to serve as an effective outside di-
rector of another company.21  An inability to prepare adequately for board 
and committee meetings, as much as a feeling of solidarity with fellow 
members of the executive class, may account for any observed tendency of 
boards with higher concentrations of executives to exhibit greater deference 
to management.22 
If this is true, one solution may be for nominating committees to give 
preference to retired CEOs over active CEOs.  Retirees may possess both 
experience (enabling them to identify when a management initiative is like-
ly to damage shareholder value and the salesmanship skills to persuade the 
other directors that is the case), and the time to devote to board service, 
making them likely to be effective in the oversight role.  On the other hand, 
an increase in the number of retired CEOs on U.S. boards may further fuel 
the stereotype that corporate directors are primarily elderly white men.  Ad-
ditionally, bringing about such an increase may require many companies to 
ease or abolish their policies mandating a retirement age for directors.  To 
the extent that there is a developing consensus among shareholders and reg-
ulators that current supervisory arrangements are inadequate, companies 
and shareholders will need to balance the benefits of experience and free 
time against those of youth and diversity in deciding how best to strengthen 
the oversight function. 
III. THE ROAD TO IMPROVEMENT 
Regardless of who is chosen to serve on the board, however, there are 
various steps that a company can take to improve the board‘s effectiveness.  
In Part III, I consider four such measures: an infrastructure to support the 
board of directors; term limits for individual board members; share owner-





  RMG guidelines consider a director to be ―overboarded‖—triggering a recommendation to share-
holders to oppose the director‘s election—when he or she serves on more than six boards.  
RISKMETRICS GROUP, U.S. PROXY VOTING MANUAL 23 (2009 ed.).  Those guidelines specify that an 
active CEO, however, should serve on no more than three boards including that of the company where 
he or she is CEO.  Id. at 24.   
22
  This is consistent with the conclusions of Fahlenbrach et al., supra note 17, at 34, who speculate 
that ―these directors are simply too busy with their day job to use their prestige, authority, and expe-
rience to have a substantial impact on the boards they sit on.‖ 
23
 Senator Charles E. Schumer recently announced plans to introduce a ―Shareholder Bill of Rights 
Act,‖ which, if enacted as proposed, would mandate many of the reforms discussed in this Essay, includ-
ing proxy access, majority voting for directors, declassification of boards, and separation of the chair-
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A. Support Infrastructure for the Board 
Sharfman and Toll suggest that ―nominating committees should select 
outside directors who have knowledge of the Company‘s business or who 
could potentially learn quickly and with a sufficient depth of understand-
ing.‖24  Beyond this, companies should establish an infrastructure to support 
the board, ensuring that directors receive timely updates on the company‘s 
operations and financial condition, and that directors can receive prompt 
answers to any questions they may have.  It is important to ensure that di-
rectors can receive corporate information that is not filtered through the 
CEO; the board, in other words, should have other ―touch points‖ at the 
company.  This infrastructure should also include regular evaluations by the 
directors of both their own performance and that of the CEO. 
B. Limited Tenure 
To ensure that boards are regularly refreshed with new blood, and to 
prevent outside directors from excessively identifying with the company 
and its management team, many investors (particularly in the United King-
dom) favor limiting the tenure of outside directors.25  Any gains from such 
increased turnover, however, must be weighed against the risk of forcing 
out a board‘s most effective outside voices—voices that may have served 
long enough to become familiar with the company‘s operational and com-
petitive environment.  To the extent that directors need time to familiarize 
themselves with a company, it may be that newly appointed directors are 
more inclined to defer to management than directors who have served long 
enough to form their own opinions about the company.  Nevertheless, all 
boards should consider the need for new members and fresh ideas (and 
skills), and think about replacing long-serving directors whose skills might 
no longer be critical.  But any mechanism to limit board tenure should be 
designed and implemented such that a certain amount of institutional mem-
ory is preserved.  This can be achieved by ensuring that there are always a 
few experienced outside directors on the board at any given time. 
                                                                                                                           
man and CEO positions. See Letter from Charles E. Schumer, Senator of New York, to his Senate 
leagues (April 2009) (on file with the Author), available at 
http://activistinvesting.blogspot.com/2009/05/sen-schumers-dear-colleague-letter-re.html (link). See also 
Dan Eggen, Opponents of ‘Shareholder Bill of Rights’ Reach Out to Sen. Schumer, 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/30/AR2009043002966.html (discussing corporate lobbying efforts aimed at 
persuading Schumer not to introduce the legislation) (link).  
24  Sharfman & Toll, Dysfunctional Deference, supra note 1, at 161. 
25
  See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH.,  § A.3.1, supra note 19, at 7 (calling on companies to state reasons 
for believing a director is independent notwithstanding having served on the board for more than nine 
years). 
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C. Director Share Ownership 
To align the interests of directors with those of shareholders, and to en-
sure that lapses in oversight by the directors will be felt in their own pock-
etbooks, all directors should be required to own a meaningful number of 
shares.26  Director share ownership can be accomplished by requiring direc-
tors to buy their own shares.  In order to prevent persons of relatively mod-
est means from being scared away from directorship, however, another 
option is to pay director fees in stock instead of cash, and to require those 
shares to be held throughout the director‘s membership on the board. 
D. Enhanced Accountability 
Finally, many shareholders would argue that the most effective way to 
ensure that directors remain focused on shareholder value—and do not be-
come overly deferential to management—is to establish a credible means 
for voting them out of office.  For this reason, majority voting for directors, 
declassification of boards, and ―proxy access‖ (the ability of shareholders to 
nominate directors without engaging in a costly proxy contest) are shaping 
up as key issues for investors and regulators alike as they seek ways to en-
hance accountability and to prevent a reoccurrence of the financial market 
meltdown.27  With public outrage over executive compensation at an all-
time high, few compensation committees—no matter how many CEOs they 
include—could afford to ignore the possibility that excessive deference to 
management on pay and other issues could lead to their dismissal and re-
placement. 
CONCLUSION 
The implosion of so many financial institutions, and the dramatic fall 
in share prices across nearly all sectors of the economy, have caused many 
observers to question the role of boards. Why did boards apparently allow 
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compensation would be properly linked to long-term performance? Under-
standing the factors that tend to undermine board effectiveness and improv-
ing the functioning of boards is critical to restoring the confidence of 
investors and the general public in equity markets and in the entire corpo-
rate system.  Pension funds and other institutional shareholders, who have 
the biggest stake in ensuring that the equity markets function smoothly and 
create sustainable value, have been urging companies to take steps to im-
prove their boards for years.  Reforms such as those proposed above, many 
of which are in place at companies outside the United States and even at 
some U.S. companies, are akin to ―shovel-ready‖ infrastructure projects: the 
necessary groundwork has already been laid, and they can be implemented 
quickly as long as the will exists. 
 
 
